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1 Introduction and motivation 
Voice over internet protocol (VoIP) is a prevailing technology allowing users to place 
phone calls over the internet and eventually to replace traditional time division 
multiplexing (TDM) telephony. According to market predictions (Infonetics Research, 
2012) in the next five years over $377 billion are to be invested on VoIP and unified 
communication (UC) services. 
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SIP and the H.323 protocol suite are currently the two prevailing standards offered  
to develop a VoIP service. SIP has been developed and supported by the internet 
community whereas the H.323 has been developed by the telecommunication companies. 
Of the two protocols, SIP is the preferred solution for connecting end user equipment 
whereas H.323 is primarily used in the interconnection of the telephony switches and in 
video conference systems. It is worth noting of Skype service in internet telephony due to 
the large market share it maintains, involving a proprietary technology run by a single 
company. 
A number of vulnerabilities have been identified for VoIP (Keromytis, 2010) and it 
seems that existing and traditional security controls and solutions like firewalls and IPSec 
cannot fully address them as VoIP operate on heterogeneous environments (Walsh and 
Kuhn, 2005) which are in principle challenging to secure. The common VoIP security 
threats involve (Dwivedi, 2009): 
• VoIP sniffing 
• VoIP phishing 
• making free calls 
• caller ID spoofing 
• anonymous eavesdropping and call redirection 
• spam over internet telephony (Gritzalis et al., 2013). 
The relatively wide adoption of VoIP by a large user base combined with its 
vulnerabilities has inevitably resulted to making such infrastructures appealing also to 
criminals. For example, organised crime may sniff a judge’s unencrypted internet phone 
call and use it for blackmailing purposes. Moreover, organised crime has the ability to  
set up and operate private telecommunication services outside the realms of official 
telephony providers. It is quite difficult for law enforcement authorities to trace this kind 
of phone calls because in most cases they are unaware of their existence and furthermore 
it can be more difficult and challenging to collect valuable and reliable evidence. 
Network forensics is an aspect of digital forensics dealing with monitoring and 
analysing network traffic aiming to collect information and find evidence of illegal 
activity. Evidence can also be found in routers’ routing tables, in content addressable 
memory (CAM) memory of switches, in firewall logs, in DHCP server logs, in web 
proxy logs, in intrusion detection systems (IDSs) logs and in authentication services logs 
(Davidoff, 2012). Fernandez et al. (2007) suggest a comprehensive list of additional 
sources such as a honeypot deployment and techniques such as IP traceback in order to 
collect security incident related information. Most of these pieces of evidence are volatile 
and change dynamically. For example, the default value of the ARP table timeout in a 
Cisco switch is set to expire after four hours. Therefore, a network forensic procedure 
must run proactively in a computer network in order to promote forensic readiness. 
However, we should also acknowledge issues surrounding proactive collection of 
evidence as such practice hardly complies with the existing legislations. 
This paper focuses on artefacts that can be collected in a VoIP service and especially 
in the SIP headers and the SIP body message where the SDP data lie. SDP is used  
“to convey media details, transport addresses, and other session description metadata to 
the participants during an internet call” [Handley et al., (2006), p.2]. SDP contains 
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information in its headers that is of a particular forensic value, as it includes the private 
IP address of the user agent. Private IP address should be used by intermediate devices 
between the SIP server and the user agent such as firewalls or routers in order to 
dynamically build and preserve the network translation table (NAT) reinsuring 
bidirectional communication. When intermediate devices do not process these headers 
(either being incapable or not configured accordingly), private IP address may reach the 
remote SIP server thus leaking information of a private network topology. Apart from the 
private IP addresses, other useful artefacts can be collected from these headers most of 
which are not logged by the SIP servers as it was confirmed during the empirical 
evaluation of this work. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a brief review of the existing 
literature on VoIP forensics. In Section 3, the relevant and worth preserving artefacts 
found in SIP and SDP headers in respective request and response methods are presented. 
We also describe the framework for the packet capture and analysis. Section 4 contains 
the empirical evaluation and results followed by a comparison of the proposed method 
related with server logging and IDS. Legislation compliance is examined in Section 5. 
Finally, Section 6 summarises the conclusions and propositions for future work. 
2 Related work 
VoIP forensics is a relatively new research area in network forensics. Researchers, law 
enforcement authorities and digital investigators have proposed methods and developed 
techniques in an effort to collect and handle the digital evidence pertaining to VoIP 
activities. Simon and Slay (2006) propose the so-called 4Ps model, comprising of 
prevention (firewalls, IDS/IPS, etc.), protection (encryption, security management, etc), 
preservation (logs, records and analysis) and presentation (vulnerability management and 
repair mechanisms). Lin and Yen (2011) further expanded the 4Ps model and have 
adjusted it to meet VoIP needs in a detailed forensics procedure called the VoIP digital 
evidence forensics standard operating procedure (DEFSOP). The preservation stage is 
now mapped to the operational stage and is further expanded to the collection, analysis 
and forensics stages. A technical limitation of this model is that when implemented it 
requires deployment of agents on all participating nodes (both clients and server) in order 
to collect the data, which in some cases may not be practically feasible as clients may not 
always reside under the same management domain with the servers and furthermore there 
may be proprietary or embedded devices (such as hardware SIP phones) with no option to 
install additional software. Such limitation needs to be addressed in future solutions and 
is a requirement for the work proposed in this paper. Yen et al. (2011) present a case 
study based on VoIP DEFSOP but similar to the above, the collection of data requires 
local acquisition and special requirements to be met such as prior installation of specific 
software to both the server and the clients. 
Hsu et al. (2011) describe a collaborative scheme for VoIP traceback. VoIP traceback 
is a challenging task because artefacts are geographically distributed in different places 
between clients, servers and network equipment that are managed by different 
administrators, or even worse, by different organisations. As such, in a scenario where a 
user resides in a private network, the private IP would need to be requested from the 
remote network operator. In our proposed work it is demonstrated that this information 
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can be obtained by mining the SDP headers which can be collected locally, without the 
need for network operator collaboration thus saving on administrative overheads. 
Irwin and Slay (2011) developed an application that searches for VoIP artefacts in the 
computer’s volatile memory. They showed that real-time transport protocol (RTP) 
conversations can be reconstructed with a significant probability of success from the data 
residing in RAM. This approach can significantly augment and complement our proposed 
method. Psaroudakis et al. (2012) demonstrated that in case of a smartphone VoIP client 
the user agent header can lead to full disclosure of a smartphone’ s make, model, and 
operating system. This has also been verified in the present work for a number of 
legitimate users. François et al. (2010) proposed a method for fingerprinting the SIP user 
agent. This method could contribute to an effort to discover spoofed SIP user agents 
headers from malicious users. In our case study it was discovered that a portion of 
malicious users attempted to hide their identities and details of the attacks by spoofing 
their user agent header. 
Li et al. (2011) suggest a VoIP building security gateway (BSG) in order to connect 
low capability end point devices whilst maintaining encryption capabilities. These 
devices could be either softphones or IP phones. The gateway can also be used for 
monitoring SIP signalling and even intercepting the voice stream. In addition, the 
gateway’s functionalities include the production of logs from devices with poor or no 
logging capabilities at all. However, this solution is limited by the CPU power of the 
BSG and the usage scope is limited by the fact that it is difficult to facilitate mobile users 
that are moving outside BSG premises. 
Pelaez and Fernandez (2009, 2010) present a model for capturing and analysing of 
VoIP traffic data through VoIP security patterns. A pattern is an encapsulated solution to 
a problem in a given context and can be used to guide the design or evaluation of systems 
(Gamma et al., 1994). As such, they proposed the VoIP evidence collector and the VoIP 
evidence analyser patterns. They move on and propose an implementation framework for 
these patterns. Their proposal has the following limitations. First, in order to perform 
correlation on real time data, the volume of network traffic captured has to be kept to a 
minimum. Second, they have attached an IDS which will trigger the capturing process 
upon a matching rule. Such setting limits the effectiveness of the proposed method as the 
capturing procedure is bounded by the quality of the IDS rules. Even if we disregard the 
possibility of losing significant evidence because of the delay (network delay, processing 
delay etc) between the triggering of the alarm and the launch of the network capture, we 
cannot ignore the fact that the IDS will not raise an alarm during a malicious but yet 
unknown activity. For example, a compromised account is such an activity that will never 
raise an alarm on the IDS, leaving thus the administrator only with the logs of the VoIP 
server. Finally, the authors do not mention the conditions under which the capture of 
network traffic stops. 
In our proposed framework, we build upon the work by Pelaez and Fernandez (2009, 
2010) and address the limitations described above. More specifically, we explore their 
proposed patterns and we construct the so-called collector and the malicious activity 
detection components for collecting raw traffic data, filtering, analysing and correlating 
them. In addition, our proposed framework is capable of collecting the headers of the 
SIP/SDP protocols in real time and filtering them in a forensically applicable manner in 
order to reveal valuable digital evidence by saving time to investigators and disk space to 
storage servers. Such arrangement allowed us to retrieve additional information such as 
end user equipment and private IP addresses. 
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3 SIP (forensic) acquisition and analysis framework 
SIP and SDP are used as a signalling protocol for the audio/video stream used during a 
VoIP call. The actual voice/video data are transmitted by the RTP. Since it is unlawful to 
intercept a voice call without a warrant we exclude monitoring, processing and analysis 
of the RTP packets. We consider that the logging and the preservation of the signalling 
data as a legal action according to the data retention directive. Such assumption is similar 
to logging e-mail metadata, rather than the actual e-mail contents. However, the 
processing and analysis of the preserved data has some barriers which are derived by the 
respective legislation. The latter is examined in the last section of this work. 
Figure 1 SIP (forensic) acquisition and analysis framework (see online version for colours) 
 
The framework (Figure 1) consists of four main components: 
• the data collecting process which collects the SIP packets from the data network 
• the SIP artefacts forming process which is achieved though database mining 
• the user’s malicious activity detection process 
• the correlation process. 
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3.1.1 Collection process 
The collection process involves an acquisition stage that continuously collects the 
network traffic. The placement of the network capture server is of great importance. The 
‘tap’ must be able to sniff all the traffic of a given network. Therefore, the network 
capture must be placed behind the border router or the main firewall of the network. 
The application running on the capture server filters the appropriate SIP and SDP 
headers of preselected SIP methods. These filtered data are then stored in a database. The 
application that collects the network traffic, filters it and stores it in the database is called 
the parser. 
3.1.2 Forming forensic artefacts in SIP/SDP 
Both SIP and SDP contain a wealth of headers. After following a thorough selection 
process, we concluded with a subset of headers and SIP methods that provide us with the 
valuable forensic evidence with low volume data fingerprint. In Table 1, we briefly 
describe these headers with their respective operation inside the protocol. Alongside we 
present the forensic relevance of these artefacts. Through database mining in headers 
values and the SIP methods we build the forensic artefacts. 
Table 1 Valuable artefacts in SIP/SDP headers and primary empirical findings 
Field Description (Rosenberg et al., 2002) Artefacts 
Frame time Universal time clock of captured 
frame. 
By using network time protocol (NTP) 
on the server that captures the packets 
we reinsure the proper logging time of 
the incident. 
Source IP 
address 
Source IP address as extracted from IP 
packet. 
Source IP address derived from IP 
packet that is harder to spoof. 
Destination 
IP address 
Destination IP address as extracted 
from IP packet. 
Destination IP address derived from 
IP packet that belongs to a local 
monitored SIP server. 
SIP from The ‘from’ header field indicates  
the logical identity of the initiator  
of the request, possibly the user’s 
address-of-record. It contains a 
uniform resource identifier (URI)  
and optionally a display name 
In the case of a request originating 
from a legitimate user of the  
service this header is expected to 
contain a legitimate and valid URI of 
a monitored SIP server. In case of an 
attack this header usually contains a 
spoofed URI. 
SIP contact The ‘contact’ header field contains the 
URI at which the user agent would 
like to receive requests, and this  
URI must be valid even if used in 
subsequent requests outside of any 
dialogs. 
In case of a legitimate request we 
expect in this header a legitimate URI. 
Some user agents report their private 
IP in this field along with the public 
IP. 
Note: 1Wireshark is a popular open source network analyser application. 
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Table 1 Valuable artefacts in SIP/SDP headers and primary empirical findings (continued) 
Field Description (Rosenberg et al., 2002) Artefacts 
SIP to The ‘to’ header field first and 
foremost specifies the desired ‘logical’ 
recipient of the request, or the 
address-of-record of the user or 
resource that is the target of this 
request. 
The conclusions we can derive  
from the ‘to’ header depend on  
how the monitored SIP server is setup. 
A SIP server may allow calls only 
between internal users or it may be 
programmed to allow calls to foreign 
(national or international) destination 
numbers. If a SIP server constantly 
receives requests to an international 
number while it is programmed only 
for internal calling, then we have a 
very strong indication of a free call 
attack. 
SIP user 
agent 
The client agent who deals the 
communication. 
Useful information is revealed in user 
agent header that is not logged by the 
servers we used for evaluation. We 
can record the name of the software 
used (softphone) and we may also 
derive information about the operating 
system. We can record the make, 
model or even firmware version in 
case a SIP phone used. Especially  
in softphones used in modern 
smartphones except for the  
application name we can derive 
information about the make and model 
of the smartphone itself. In case of an 
attack this field will contain either a 
string of random characters or the 
name of the tool used (i.e., SipCli). 
Via Shows the transport protocol used and 
the request route, each proxy adds a 
line. 
By examining the ‘via’ header we may 
discover an incoming request through 
an intermediate proxy. 
Call-Id Unique identifier for each call which 
contains the host address. It must be 
the same for all the messages within a 
transaction. 
This is the identification string of each 
call and can be useful when tracing a 
call between SIP proxies. 
Cseq Cseq begins with a random number 
and it identifies in a sequential way 
each message. 
The ‘Cseq’ header is used to trace the 
reply message from the SIP server for 
each request we monitor, as SIP runs 
over UDP which is stateless. 
SDP owner This field gives the originator of the 
session (her username and the address 
of the user’s host) plus a session 
identifier and a version number. 
The ‘SDP owner’ header contains 
information about the remote user and 
the remote IP address. In case of a 
legitimate user this IP is the same with 
the source IP or the private IP of the 
remote host if it is connected through 
NAT. In case of an attack it is usually 
spoofed (it seems to depend on the 
attacking tool used). 
Note: 1Wireshark is a popular open source network analyser application. 
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Table 1 Valuable artefacts in SIP/SDP headers and primary empirical findings (continued) 
Field Description (Rosenberg et al., 2002) Artefacts 
SDP 
connection 
This field contains connection data. A 
session description MUST contain 
either at least one ‘c=’ field in each 
media description or a single ‘c=’ 
field at the session level. 
This header contains the IP address of 
the requesting peer. 
SDP session 
name 
This field is the textual session name. This header is usually named after the 
application in case of softphone. In 
case of an attack it is usually left 
blank. 
SDP media 
attributes 
Attributes are the primary means for 
extending SDP. Attributes may be 
defined to be used as ‘session-level’ 
attributes, ‘media-level’ attributes, or 
both. 
In ‘SDP media attributes’ we can  
find information about audio codec 
capabilities of the remote host. It is 
worth mentioning that in this field  
we can also find the private IP of  
the remote host when it is connected 
though NAT. In one case, we 
discovered three private IPs of  
the remote host. In some attacks we 
found this field being spoofed. In 
some other attacks private IP of the 
remote attacker was revealed. 
Info request 
(wireshark1) 
n/a This field is generated by the popular 
wireshark packet analyser application. 
It provides brief information about 
each packet captured relating to the 
underlying application. In our case, 
this field provides information relating 
to the SIP context, so we are informed 
of the SIP methods used for each 
transaction. 
Info 
response 
(wireshark) 
n/a Similar to the above, but for the 
respective response. 
Note: 1Wireshark is a popular open source network analyser application. 
3.2 SIP methods requests and responses 
The SIP protocol uses request methods originating from the caller in order to establish a 
call session. The callee responds to the specific request with a corresponding response 
code. There are 14 SIP request methods and six classes of response codes. From a 
forensics perspective we examine the packets containing request methods like ‘INVITE’, 
‘REGISTER’, ‘SUBSRIBE’ and ‘OPTIONS’. The SIP response codes of the 4xx class 
and 2xx class with session description class are also examined. 
3.2.1 INVITE/REGISTER requests 
The INVITE method request indicates that a SIP User-Agent is being invited to 
participate in a call session (RFC 3261). A typical successful SIP transaction during an 
INVITE negotiation is illustrated in Figure 1. The remote user (denoted as the 
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smartphone icon) is eligible (authenticated, in access list, etc.) for placing a call and 
received a ‘Status 200 OK’ response code. The same applies during a successful 
REGISTER request. The REGISTER method registers the SIP user-agent’s address (that 
is listed in the ‘to’ header field) with a SIP server (RFC 3261). 
Figure 2 SIP INVITE negotiation (see online version for colours) 
 
From a forensics perspective, during the SIP INVITE and the SIP REGISTER requests a 
great wealth of information is revealed. For a given user we can find the source IP of the 
remote host, the user agent application, the caller ID that a user has set to his application, 
the calling party and sometimes even the private IP hidden behind a NAT. Depending on 
the user agent software employed, the private IP address can be found in various headers 
and differing locations, as there seems to be no standard approach of imprinting the IP 
addresses in the SIP headers. Recording the private IP address can significantly help 
investigators resolve a case when the incident occurs behind a NAT server. 
From the empirical experiment it was also confirmed that some applications report 
their private IP address during the REGISTER process in the SIP via and/or the SIP 
contact header. 
Below we present an excerpt of a typical SIP message along with the included SDP 
headers and the information that needs to be preserved for further analysis. The 
forensically interesting data are shown in bold font. 
Time 2013-05-01 23:35:57.978170 
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 5.xx.xx.210 (5.xx.xx.210), Dst: 192.xxx.xxx.37 
(192.xxx.xxx.37) 
Session Initiation Protocol 
Request-Line: INVITE sip:71150@sip.xxxx.gr SIP/2.0 
Message Header 
Via: SIP/2.0/UDP 5.xx.xx.210:61624;branch=z9hG4bK-d8754z-320fc157e67ba641-1---
d8754z-;rport 
Contact: <sip:402@5.xx.xx.210:61624> 
To: “71150”<sip:71150@sip.xxxx.gr> 
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From: “jpsaroud windows”<sip:402@sip.xxxx.gr>;tag=3f498445 
Call-ID: MmFmYWFjNTk1ZTQzOTdhM2JiODJiNDAyZGNkOTRiZmU. 
CSeq: 1 INVITE 
User-Agent: eyeBeam release 1102q stamp 51814 
Session Description Protocol 
Owner/Creator, Session Id (o): - 5 2 IN IP4 5.xx.xx.210 
Owner Network Type: IN 
Owner Address Type: IP4 
Owner Address: 5.xx.xx.210 
Session Name (s): CounterPath eyeBeam 1.5 
Connection Information (c): IN IP4 5.xx.xx.210 
Connection Network Type: IN 
Connection Address Type: IP4 
Connection Address: 5.54.64.210 
Media Attribute (a): alt:1 4 : UhYE2Wox sLbn3kLo 5.54.64.210 24784 
Media Attribute (a): alt:2 3 : R828U4V/ lW4gLyQM 10.10.10.1 24784 
Media Attribute (a): alt:3 2 : M4f701Fm 5Gw9wOoX 192.168.61.1 24784 
Media Attribute (a): alt:4 1 : BndXE2LR CPxnI5x9 192.168.111.1 24784 
Info: Request: INVITE sip:71150@sip.xxxx.gr, with session description 
3.2.2 OPTIONS request 
OPTIONS request is a keep-alive mechanism to assist in determining whether a remote 
user agent/SIP server is presently available before actually placing a phone call. It is also 
used to enable a SIP entity to query for the capabilities (such as audio codecs available 
for the RTP stream, available extensions of a remote SIP entity, etc.) in advance of 
establishing a dialog without ‘ringing’ the remote entity (RFC 3261). 
From a forensics perspective it appears that malicious users make use of this attribute 
in order to perform a reconnaissance task and discover available SIP servers in a given 
network. Similar to a ping scan used for revealing alive hosts, an OPTIONS scan can 
expose alive SIP servers and their programmed extensions. Furthermore, if OPTIONS 
messages are used for fingerprinting a network they are not normally detected as an 
attack by an IDS (snort in OSSIM was tested) and are not logged from SIP servers 
(Asterisk servers tested). This is because OPTIONS is not malicious in its nature and 
purpose, but this mechanism is open to abuse by an attacker. As such, this type of attack 
remains invisible to the network administrator but can be disclosed by the proposed 
application. 
3.3 SIP response codes 
3.3.1 STATUS 200 OK with session description 
As mentioned earlier a ‘STATUS 200 OK’ response message is sent to a remote host 
after a successful SIP INVITE or REGISTER request. 
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From a forensics perspective it was also observed that some applications report their 
private IP address during an OPTIONS reply message to their respective registration 
server. Remote SIP user agents reply to an OPTIONS request with a ‘STATUS: 200 OK’ 
message with session description (SDP). The private IP address is found inside the SDP 
owner and the SDP connection info headers. 
3.3.2 4xx – client failure responses 
Indication of malicious activity is considered when the SIP server responds to repetitive 
unsuccessful SIP INVITE messages, that is, ‘404 Not Found’. When the server is 
programmed to accept anonymous requests, a 404 message is an indication of a 
reconnaissance scan. If the server accepts anonymous requests, then an IDS rule can be in 
force that accumulates the number of unsuccessful requests from a single IP and alerts if 
a set threshold of number of failed requests is exceeded. However, only the server 
maintains the information of valid SIP extensions (dial plan) and can distinguish between 
a 404 relating to a valid yet unavailable and a 404 caused by a non-existent extension 
(Figure 3). 
Figure 3 Unsuccessful SIP INVITE negotiations (see online version for colours) 
 
On the other hand when a SIP server is configured to allow only authenticated users, a 
SIP response like ‘Status 403 Forbidden’/‘Status 401 Unauthorised’ is sent. Repetitive 
alike messages are a strong indication of an on-going brute force attack. 
3.4 Malicious activity detection process 
Through a data mining process in the formed artefact database we are able to discover 
some indications or even proof of malicious activity. Before we proceed to describing the 
detection process we first define a series of relevant terms and set a list of assumptions as 
follows: 
• Internal users: We define as internal users those who have an account in one of the 
SIP servers of the organisation. The accounts that have been created and used for this 
project is assumed that during the baseline phase are not compromised. Any new 
account that is created goes through a baseline phase. An internal user can access the 
SIP services from either inside or outside the organisations’ data network premises. 
A user may place a call with another user of the same SIP server or with a user that is 
registered to a different SIP server. 
• External users: We define as external users those who do not have a valid account to 
any of the SIP servers of the organisation. An external user may place a call for an 
internal user and vice versa. 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
    A method for forensic artefact collection, analysis and incident response 13    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
• Baseline phase: We define as a baseline phase for the internal users a period of  
time of normal user activity. We consider as normal activity the installation of  
the provided account into only one device (PC softphone, mobile device softphone, 
IP phone, analogue phone adapter) with ordinary daily usage. During this phase, we 
assume or reinsure no malicious activity or compromise. This is similar to building a 
profile for anomaly detection IDS type of approaches (Katos, 2005). 
• Internal user profile: We define as a user profile a set of attributes that their values 
remain constant during the baseline phase. These attributes are derived from the 
information contained in the SIP headers (Table 1) as well as from the underlying 
business logic that is reflected by the users’ ‘trends’ and behaviour. Especially in 
SDP media attributes header, where we have a lot of information we can store a 
MD5 hash value in order to do the comparison. In this work we constructed three 
internal users’ profiles, as described below. 
• Fixed: By the term fixed we denote the user profile that matches the operation of 
VoIP adapters, IP phones and VoIP capable routers (usually with a FXS interface). 
The main characteristics of this profile are the absence of changes in a series of 
attributes such as the IP (either public or private) and a 24 hours daily operation of 
precise interval registration. 
• PC softphone: This refers to a different user profile, were we include the PCs that 
run a VoIP software application. The main characteristics of this profile are the 
regular and benign changes of IP address typically reflecting roaming scenarios or IP 
changes due to DHCP operations. 
• Mobile: This is also a user profile. In this profile we include the mobile devices 
(smartphones, tablets) that run a VoIP software application with a HSPA or Wi-Fi 
connection to the internet. The main characteristics are the frequent changes of the 
public IP address and a daily hour’s operation. 
3.4.1 GeoIP information 
In a typical organisational setting, SIP is allocated to users who may have a given 
geographical distribution and the access policy can be configured to reflect such 
distribution. During our empirical evaluation we were able to verify this assertion. All 
users who participated in this research were found to be located in Greece and Belgium 
as expected. We used the Maxmind database (Maxmind Geolite, 2013) and we did 
confirm the accuracy of the GeoIP results in the base of the country. 
We summarise the profile attributes in Table 2. 
We also consider that both internal and external users may behave in a malicious 
manner. For example an internal malicious user may place a threatening call and then 
deny it. He may claim that his account was compromised. In addition the fact that he is 
behind a NAT server makes him believe that he is undetectable. 
An external user may try to take advantage of a SIP server’s misconfiguration that 
will allow him to place a free call or even may try to brute force a valid account. 
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Table 2 Baseline user profiles table 
Attribute Fixed PC softphones Mobile 
1 Operating system Constant 
(firmware) 
Constant Constant 
2 Application name Constant Constant Constant 
3 U
se
r a
ge
nt
 
Device Constant N/A Constant 
4  Private IP Constant Variable Variable 
5  Caller ID Constant Constant Constant 
6  Source IP Applicable  
to user 
Variable Variable 
7  GeoIP (source IP) Constant  
(city) 
Constant  
(country) 
Constant  
(country) 
8  SDP media attributes Constant  
(specific to  
user agent 
capabilities and 
user preferences) 
Constant  
(specific to  
user agent 
capabilities and 
user preferences) 
Constant  
(specific to  
user agent 
capabilities and 
user preferences) 
9  Register intervals Constant Constant Constant 
10  Daily routine (trend) Constant Specific to user N/A 
11  401 messages Constant Constant Constant 
  Total of constant values 10 7 8 
3.4.1.1 Malicious activity detection of internal users 
Malicious activity detection of internal users is detected through statistical analysis. 
Every internal user is assigned with a profile according to his type of device and use. 
When the baseline phase is complete we can fill in Table 2 with the derived constant 
values. Periodical checks in the artefacts database can monitor any change in the profile’s 
constant values. Every change in these attributes must be investigated against a possible 
attack. 
3.4.1.2 External users 
In order to detect malicious activity from external users we use a different approach. 
More analytically, we constructed the following list of series of events and actions that 
are needed to run and be checked periodically: 
• OPTIONS method scans: As already mentioned, we consider repetitive OPTIONS 
requests from a single IP as a part of a reconnaissance phase of an upcoming attack 
aiming to identify available SIP servers in a network. Any OPTIONS scans incident 
needs to be investigated. 
• 401 and 404 messages to external IPs: As stated before, repetitive 401 and 404 
response messages are sent to a specific IP address who issues INVITE or 
REGISTER requests. 
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• Spoofed headers: We noticed that the SIP server’s logging is based on the SIP 
headers that are easy to be spoofed. We check for spoofed data in various headers  
for a given source IP. More precisely we check in the SIP from header, the SDP 
connection info, and the user agent for spoofed data. 
• User-agent: We check the value of the user-agent against a list of known  
user-agents. 
• Empty SDP: An INVITE request should contain the SDP connection info. INVITE 
messages with empty SDP information is an indication that the caller’s primary goal 
is not to actually place a call. 
• Private IP: Whenever possible, we record the private IP of the external user. 
Although not useful during the detection process, it may really be helpful  
when an investigation is underway for identifying the real attacker. 
3.4.2 Correlation process 
The findings and normalised data from the previous steps will also go through a 
correlation process and will be combined with information from various sources. Firstly 
we need to examine the root cause of the 404 messages. The process attempts to identify 
whether these messages are provoked due to unavailable users or because of a free call 
attack. This is achieved by correlating the calling number with the servers’ dial plan. 
OPTIONS scans are correlated against the list of operating SIP servers and GeoIP 
information. Spoofed headers and user-agent values are correlated with information from 
an IDS with well defined signatures. The same correlation process is also followed for 
internal users if they are found to cause 4xx messages. 
4 Evaluation 
The implementation of the proposed framework involved the development of a number of 
tools and scripts. The network captures were performed with the tcpdump utility. The 
parser leveraged utilities such the tshark software which is the command line tool of the 
wireshark network analyser application, sed and awk. The database that was employed is 
MySQL. Database views were used to manage the data retrieval complexity and improve 
data access speed. For instance, several views were built with mappings of date time, 
username, user-agent, remote public IP and remote private IP. Furthermore, views  
were setup aiming to identify ongoing attacks with repetitive failed ‘REGISTER’ and 
‘INVITE’ requests while views with repetitive ‘OPTIONS’ requests were used to 
highlight reconnaissance activities of an upcoming attack. Needless to mention, the 
application is also capable of preserving evidence such as remote IPs and fake or spoofed 
user-agent information. 
In order to evaluate the framework, a network traffic capture of the university’s 
border router connection to the internet was set up (Figure 4). The university’s border 
router has a gigabit Ethernet connection and advertises nine class C networks through 
border gateway protocol (BGP). The traffic capture was preformed over a period of ten 
days. 
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Figure 4 Network traffic capture layout (see online version for colours) 
SiSi
 
From a technical perspective, the acquisition is feasible by employing a gigabit Ethernet 
switch capable of mirroring all available virtual LAN (VLAN) ports to a specific port 
(tap). The tap fed the collected data to the network collection station. It is a host that after 
acquiring the SIP data (normally creating a pcap file), it parses them, extracts the relevant 
headers (described in Table 1) and stores them in a database. In production environments 
the network monitoring station should also be equipped with a second network interface 
connected to the management VLAN allowing remote connections. 
Upon collection, normalising and storage of the SIP data, the analysis component 
(database views) will extract the values for each internal user. It will then fill in its 
corresponding user profile. It will then search for indications of malicious activity 
according to the proposed methods. The findings will be correlated with the information 
provided by the underlying policies (such as dial plans) and from other sources (such as 
GeoIP information, OSSIM IDS) in order to pin down the malicious attempts against the 
SIP infrastructure. 
4.1.1 Internal users’ profiles filling 
We created 16 sip accounts on three different SIP servers and delivered them to a group 
of users who were located in Greece and Belgium. The accounts were installed in  
16 different devices including IP phones, one router with VoIP capabilities and PCs and 
smartphones with software phones. During the baseline phase we were able to populate 
the database by filling in the information described in Table 3 for each user. For brevity 
reasons we present the findings for five of them which cover all the cases. It is worth 
mentioning that all five devices were outside university premises connected though 
another ISP. 
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Table 3 Internal users filled profiles 
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Figure 5 Internal users’ profiles 
 
None of the legitimate users changed the profile’s constant values except for one user in 
Belgium who travelled to Luxembourg and the USA and this information was reflected in 
his profile. The incident was investigated and it was revealed that the Luxembourg case 
was because of a roaming Wi-Fi. The USA location was reported because the underlying 
application (Acrobits) was using a server in the USA as a rendezvous point when IOS 
was in sleep mode. 
4.1.2 External user malicious activity detection 
After applying the method for the external users and examining the event list described 
earlier in this paper, we obtained the following results (Figure 6). Unsuccessful 
REGISTER attempts were about 77% of the total attacks. It is obvious that the attacker 
believes that gaining access to an account will grant him with cost free calls. The 
malicious users tried to register to one of the monitored SIP servers by testing various 
possible accounts. It appears that the goal was not to brute force one specific account by a 
dictionary attack. Instead they tested a huge combination of possible user accounts with 
no password set. This can be crosschecked with the information provided by the dial 
plan. A large group of non-existent users verifies the attack. GeoIP information is yet 
another factor to confirm the attack. 
Unsuccessful INVITE requests were about 19% of the total attacks. It appears that the 
malicious users tried to place a call without prior exploitation of a valid account. This can 
be observed in the case of a misconfigured SIP server for example. As an INVITE 
request is a legitimate one, it cannot be tracked by an IDS. In order to verify that an 
unsuccessful INVITE is actually a malicious one, we crosscheck the callee with the 
information provided by the dial plan. In such case, a non-existent callee can confirm the 
attack. Moreover it was discovered that attackers sometimes tried to exploit server 
vulnerabilities by using special characters in the dialled string. GeoIP information is 
another source of information to confirm the attack. 
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Figure 6 SIP request methods used in identified attacks (see online version for colours) 
 
OPTIONS requests account to the 4% of the total attacks. OPTIONS requests were used 
in order to identify SIP running servers in the network. Correlation with known SIP 
servers inside the organisation and the GeoIP information of the remote user confirms the 
malicious intention of the OPTIONS request. 
It appears that popular VoIP auditing tools have been transformed to attack tools. We 
were able to identify two of them, namely the SIPVicious and the Sip/Cli auditing tools. 
SIPVicious is a popular open source software suite to audit VoIP capable PBXs based on 
the SIP protocol, written in Python (SIPVicious, 2013). A number of variants of 
SIPVicious are available aiming to change the signatures of software (such as the crucial 
User Agent value) in order to avoid detection from IDS software. It appears that 
SipVicious was used in the vast the majority of the attacks as it supports the INVITE, the 
REGISTER and the OPTIONS requests methods (Figure 7). 
Figure 7 Tools identified during the SIP attacks (see online version for colours) 
 
SipCli is a command line SIP user agent that runs on Microsoft Windows operating 
systems (SipCli, 2013). It is designed for penetration testing of VoIP software PBXs. It 
sends SIP INVITE messages with the option to set source IP interface, SIP port,  
SIP proxy/port, SIP username and password. During our tests it was mainly used as a 
brute-force attack tool. 
The most common attributes is the name of the user-agent used that is ‘sipcli/v1.8’ 
and the presence of SIP body text with SDP headers. The latter reveals the private IP 
address of the attacker if located behind a NAT server. 
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We discovered another attacking tool which was used occasionally. We were not able 
to identify the application. However, its main characteristic was that it spoofed almost 
every possible field. 
A thorough analysis of the findings related to the malicious users and their attacking 
tools can be found in our supporting website http://isir.ee.duth.gr/?page_id=267. 
Many of the above attacks were also identified by the operational IDS. The signature 
tried to match the value ‘friendly-scanner’ of the SIP user agent of the SipVicious tool. 
However, we discovered variants of the SipVicious as its source code is freely available 
on the internet. It is very easy for anyone to change the value of the user agent header. 
4.1.3 Troubleshooting 
A side benefit of the application is that it can provide to the administrator activities for 
exposing various service errors. For instance, the number of SIP messages received from 
a valid internal user agent over time indicates network activity and can be used to deduce 
conclusions on the health state of the network. As such, an excessive amount of SIP 
messages can be an indication of a network appliance misconfiguration and the network 
administrator must be alerted. Error messages from SIP servers with error codes such as 
‘500 Internal Server Error’ can also guide the system administrators to detect and correct 
such errors in a timely manner. 
4.1.4 Comparisons with existing logging methods 
If we do a comparison of the proposed scheme for collecting and preserving SIP artefacts 
and traditional server logging, we can draw up some conclusions that are presented in 
Table 4. 
Table 4 Comparison between network logging and server logging 
Artefact Proposed scheme logging Server side (asterisk) logging 
User agent   
Operating system Yes No 
Application Yes No 
Device Yes No 
Private IP Yes No 
Source IP (REGISTER) Yes Yes 
Source IP (INVITE) Yes No (SIP channel only) 
Unauthorised 401 Yes Yes 
Not found 404 Yes Yes (indirect) 
SIP from (caller ID) Yes Yes 
OPTIONS method Yes No 
Encrypted data No Yes 
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We can also derive some benefits of the proposed logging scheme. 
1 vendor/platform independent 
2 create logs even for devices that are incapable of producing enriched logs  
(aka VoIP adapters, mobile softphones) 
3 normalised logs, easy process and correlation with other sources. 
The proposed method is agnostic of the current SIP infrastructure of an organisation. This 
approach is easy to deploy and it is independent of the vendor or platform of the existing 
servers. The only prerequisite is compliance with the SIP protocol. However, we expect 
that this approach can be adapted to operate in other VoIP standards. 
This solution provides us also with the ability to produce logs for every SIP capable 
device. During the experiments and the development of the application we came across 
persistent attacks targeting stand alone SIP devices. Even if we enabled syslog messages 
on an IP phone, the provided logging information is insufficient as the forensically 
interesting traffic data are not included in a standard log. In addition there are 
applications with no logging capabilities at all such as softphones on mobile devices. 
Finally, the produced logs are already normalised and they can be easily processed and 
correlated with information from other sources. 
4.1.5 Similarities and differences between IDS and network logging 
We can point out some differences between an IDS and the proposed network logging. 
They both perform deep packet inspection but also exhibit key differences. For an IDS, if 
a packed matches a rule, it will be logged and an alarm will be triggered. An IDS also 
performs real time inspection, making it a monitoring tool. For the network logging 
approach all packets are systematically logged and alerts are generated during the audit 
stage. As such, network logging is not designed to operate as a real time detection 
process, although capturing is performed in real time. In addition, network logging will 
require a significant amount of storage. 
Against the above it can be concluded that the proposed method is not a solution that 
comes to replace existing server logging or an IDS. It is a complementary tool to support 
forensic readiness. The main goal is to gather volatile SIP artefacts that can be used 
during an investigation of an incident and to increase the reliability of the IDS. 
5 Legal limitations on operating this application on a network 
In this section, we deal with concerns on implementing this solution in production 
networks. Proactive creation and preservation of evidence facilitate without any doubt the 
investigation in a successful and cost-effective manner. Forensic readiness is proved to be 
valuable when – especially – volatile data have to be acquired and preserved. However, 
needless to say, the process of a forensic investigation is subject to considerable scrutiny 
of both the integrity of the evidence, meant as the “information by which facts tend  
to be proved”, and the integrity of the investigation process (Rowlingson, 2004). When 
developing such an approach we should take into consideration that it raises ethical and 
legal issues pertaining to the secrecy of communications and privacy of the concerned 
persons and that the lawfulness and, consequently, the admissibility of evidence in court 
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depend upon the respect of legal constraints and guarantees, laid down in legislation 
pertaining to communicational and informational privacy. 
Firstly, (massive or routine) proactive collection and preservation of evidence as such 
undermines the ‘traditional’ current constitutional model, which relies upon gathering 
conclusive evidence of wrongdoing of suspect individuals. A model that equates forensic 
readiness with indiscriminate collection of – probably! – useful evidence that is carried 
out against individuals at random would blow up the cornerstones of the rule of law state 
(Hoffmann-Riem, 2002), as it would perceive all citizens as potentially future threats 
(Lepsius, 2004), if not offenders and criminals. Extended production and collection of 
evidence mirrors the shift from a constitutional state guarding against the threat of 
specific risks in specific situations toward a security-orientated preventive state, which 
acts operatively and proactively but at the same time interferes with the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of the citizens (Mitrou, 2008). 
Traditionally, the interception and collection of content data (i.e., the meaning or 
purport of the communication, or the message or information being conveyed by the 
communication) has been a useful tool for law enforcement authorities. When 
introducing evidence collection approaches into an infrastructure we should bear in mind 
that – even if content the of the communication is not intercepted – evidence gathering 
and readiness is based upon the collection and logging of the so-called subscriber’s 
and/or communication/traffic data. The use of such a method for law enforcement 
purposes (or even for the purposes of corporate forensics) is subject to the conditions and 
procedures provided by the respective law pertaining to the protection of communications 
secrecy and informational privacy. 
The provisions of the EU e-privacy directive relate to ‘traffic data’ as “any data 
processed for the purpose of the conveyance of a communication on an electronic 
communications network or for the billing thereof” (Art. 2b). Different communications 
infrastructures give rise to different forms of transactional data (Rotenberg et al., 2006). 
The e-privacy directive covers all traffic data ‘in a technology neutral way’, i.e., those of 
traditional circuit-switched telephony as well as packet-switched internet transmission. 
(The Council of Europe (2001), assigning ‘traffic data’ to a specific legal regime, defines 
it as “any computer data relating to a communication by means of a computer system, 
generated by a computer system that formed a part in the chain of communication, 
indicating the communication’s origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or 
type of underlying service” (Art. 1d). Under European Law (Data Protection Framework 
Directive), to the extent that this data is relating to an identified or identifiable natural 
person, it is deemed to be “personal data” (Art. 2a). In US law (Stored Communications 
Act), ‘transactional’ data lists certain customer record information: the customers’ name, 
address, phone numbers, billing records, and types of services the customer utilises. The 
US Government Printing Office (2001) expanded this list to include “records of session 
times and durations”, any temporarily assigned network address, and “any credit card or 
bank account number” used for payment (Mitrou, 2008). 
Highly important for law enforcement purposes are the measures of traffic data 
preservation and data retention. As underlined in the Explanatory Report of the 
Cybercrime Convention of the Council of Europe, traffic data might last only 
ephemerally, which would make it necessary to order its expeditious preservation. In the 
language of the Cybercrime Convention, data preservation is the procedure of keeping 
stored data secure and safe. The preservation measures apply also to computer data that 
“has been stored by means of a computer system”, which presupposes that the data 
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already exists, has already been collected, and is stored. Expedited data preservation 
claims, within the framework of a specific investigation or proceeding, the right for the 
relevant authorities to compel a provider (already in possession of certain data on a 
specific subscriber/user) to conserve it against the possibility of disappearing. The 
Convention sets out procedural powers to be adopted by the signing States: expedited 
preservation of stored data; expedited preservation and partial disclosure of traffic data; 
production order; search and seizure of computer data; realtime collection of traffic data. 
On the other side, according to the European Convention on Human Rights 
communications surveillance is unacceptable, unless it fulfils three fundamental criteria 
set in Art. 8 (2): 
1 a legal basis 
2 the need/necessity of the measure in a democratic society 
3 the conformity of the measure with the legitimate interests of national security, 
public safety, or the economic well-being of a country, prevention or disorder of 
crime, protection of health or morals, or protection of the rights and freedoms of the 
others (Coemans and Dumortier 2003). 
As specified by the European Court of Human Rights in the case Copland v.  
United Kingdom, the creation, retention and/or preservation of traffic data falls under the 
protection of communicational secrecy, which means that the need for – especially 
proactive – evidence gathering and storing has to be weighed against the harms and 
infringements for communicational privacy. The objective pursued must be balanced 
against the seriousness of the interference, which is to be judged taking into account, inter 
alia, the number and nature of persons affected and the intensiveness of the negative 
effects. For these reasons such a method should be implemented only in relation to 
crimes that are regarded by the law as ‘severe’ or ‘national security threats’ and with 
specific institutional conditions to be fulfilled in order to investigate a criminal incident 
in accordance with necessity and proportionality requirements. 
6 Conclusions and future work 
In this paper, we examined the feasibility of conducting forensic investigations in VoIP 
infrastructures and presented a framework for collecting and analysing the data that can 
potentially detect attacks and reveal information including private IPs, network 
topologies and end user equipment. The popular SIP protocol was used as a vehicle to 
demonstrate the processes for correlating and interpreting the forensic artifacts. An 
advantage of the proposed framework over existing approaches like DEFSOP presented 
in the beginning of this paper is that all the data required for extracting the necessary 
evidence can be directly obtained by the (local) network captures without the requirement 
of a special data colleting agent installed on the SIP entities. 
The importance of forensic readiness is evident, as it is realised that if certain volatile 
network data are not captured, recorded and logged (which is the case in most VoIP 
deployments), it would not be possible to identify and trace an attack to its origin. Since 
VoIP is becoming a very popular technology adopted by a large number of users 
worldwide, it is imperative for the SIP provider to cater for forensic readiness capabilities 
as it is expected that the attacks will be frequent, affect many legitimate users and may 
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cause a financial damage to both operators and end users. The tools used for attacking 
VoIP services are widely available. In fact, most of them have existed for a while now as 
they were initially developed for serving security audit purposes. 
Furthermore, the benefit of promoting forensic readiness practices is twofold. First, it 
supports the identification of the source of a threat and an attacker as mentioned earlier. 
Second, it provides invaluable information and feedback to the administrators for 
debugging purposes and for facilitating troubleshooting when required. 
It was also shown that the additional layer of complexity introduced in an internet 
worked environment by using VoIP solutions has a negative impact on privacy. 
Therefore, the trade-off between privacy and accountability needs to be carefully 
addressed with both technical and legislative controls. 
Future work involves the further development of the tools and its integration with 
IDSs in order to support real time operation. In addition, the framework will need to be 
enriched with applications capable of performing similar analysis on VoIP technologies 
other than SIP, such as H.323 and possibly closed systems such as Skype. 
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Appendix 
The geolocation identification of the malicious users (Figure 8). An up to date 
distribution of attacks is maintained in http://isir.ee.duth.gr/?page_id=267. For every 
mark there is detailed information about the type of the attack along with the tool used. 
Colour indicates the tool used. User agent information is maintained for internal users 
(Figure 9). 
Figure 8 Malicious users’ GeoIP (see online version for colours) 
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Figure 9 GeoIP location of internal users (see online version for colours) 
 
